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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joanne Nicole Christofferson appeals from the judgment entered upon
her guilty plea to felony vehicular manslaughter.

On appeal Christofferson

claims the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for
additional defense services pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Christofferson was driving east on U.S. Highway 30. (R., pp. 14-17, 2729.) She crossed the centerline and drove into the westbound lane. (R., pp. 1417.) Christofferson crashed her car into a motorcycle ridden by Staci Shyrock.
(R., p. 15.) Ms. Shyrock flew off her motorcycle and landed on the pavement.
(R., p. 17.) Christofferson crashed her car into a fence. (Id.) Christofferson was
transported by an ambulance to the hospital. (R., p. 15.) The crash killed Ms.
Shyrock. (R., p. 15.)
At the scene, the officers found a glass pipe with white methamphetamine
residue in Christofferson’s purse. (R., pp. 15-16.) They also found pills in a
prescription bottle. (Id.) The prescription was not in Christofferson’s name. (Id.)
Prior to Christofferson’s crash, a witness observed Christofferson driving
all over the road. (R., pp. 16-17.) The witness was afraid Christofferson was
going to hit his car. (Id.) Another witness also reported seeing a cell phone in
Christofferson’s hand right after the crash. (R., p. 15.)
At the hospital, Christofferson admitted to smoking marijuana before she
drove. (R., p. 16.) Christofferson also reported that she used methamphetamine
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and prescription pills earlier that day.

(R., p. 32.)

Hospital staff found a

methamphetamine pipe on Christofferson. (R., p. 32.)
The state charged Christofferson with felony vehicular manslaughter. (R.,
pp. 55-56, 117-118.) Christofferson pled guilty and the district court ordered a
presentence investigation report, including an I.C. § 19-2524 mental health
assessment. (R., pp. 115-116, 119; see also PSI, pp. 35-49.) Christofferson
filed an ex parte motion for additional defense services pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 12.2. (R., pp. 128-130.) Specifically, Christofferson represented
she had a “significant and complicated mental health history” with “potential”
diagnoses and she requested $5,000 to $10,000 to retain the services of a
forensic psychologist to conduct a “comprehensive psychological evaluation to
assist for mitigation purposes at sentencing.” (Id.)

The district court denied

Christofferson’s motion for additional defense services because a mental health
screening and, if necessary, an evaluation were already ordered as part of
Christofferson’s pre-sentence investigation. (R., pp. 135-140.)
As part of the pre-sentencing investigation a GAIN-Recommendation and
Referral Summary was conducted. (PSI, pp. 35-46.) A “§ 19-2524 DHW Mental
Examination Report” was also conducted.

(PSI, pp. 47-49.)

At sentencing,

Christofferson’s counsel argued that the “§ 19-2524 DHW Mental Examination
Report” did not comply with the statutory requirements. (2/26/16 Tr., p. 71, L. 24
– p. 77, L. 3.) However, Christofferson, through her counsel, told the district
court that she did not want the mental health evaluation. (2/26/16 Tr., p. 76, Ls.
11-17, p. 85, L. 17 – p. 86, L. 5.)
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THE COURT: So I’m a little confused.
MR. KUMM: So am I.
THE COURT: 19-2524, you have had this PSI since approximately
December 30th, and you talked to your client about 19-2524. This
is the first I have heard of you objecting that that wasn’t done, but
you have talked with your client. She says, no, I don’t want it. So
I’m a little confused as to what you want.
MR. KUMM: Yeah, well, so am I. Your Honor. Like I said, I just
want to express what my client’s wishes are.
(2/26/16 Tr., p. 84, L. 21 – p. 85, L. 7.) The district court concluded that based,
upon the I.C. § 19-2524 requirements, Christofferson should have been referred
to the Department of Health and Welfare for a full evaluation, but that there was
sufficient mental health information to proceed with sentencing. (2/26/16 Tr., p.
95, L. 24 – p. 96, L. 16.)
At the sentencing hearing the state recommended ten years with seven
years fixed. (2/26/16 Tr., p. 60, L. 21 – p. 61, L. 9.) Christofferson’s counsel
gave a variety of recommendations. (2/26/16 Tr., p. 80, Ls. 13-20, p. 84, Ls. 617, p. 96, L. 24 – p. 97, L. 13.) He recommended one year of incarceration, or
that the court retain jurisdiction, followed by a period or probation for four years.
(Id.) He also recommended the court place Christofferson in a “problem-solving
court” like Mental Health Court. (Id.)
The district court examined the presentence investigation, the GAIN
assessment and the I.C. § 19-2524 assessment, and the letters and the
comments from the victim’s family and Christofferson’s family. (2/26/16 Tr., p.
104, L. 22 – p. 113, L. 9.) The district court entered judgment and sentenced
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Christofferson to ten years with five years fixed. (2/26/16 Tr., p. 105, L. 13 – p.
112, L. 23; R., pp. 153-158.) Christofferson timely appealed. (R., pp. 159-161.)

4

ISSUE
Christofferson states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms.
Christofferson’s Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 motion for additional
defense services?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Christofferson failed to show the district court abused its discretion
when it denied her Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 motion for additional defense
services?
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ARGUMENT
Christofferson Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Cristofferson’s Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 motion

for a mental health evaluation because Idaho Code § 19-2524 already provided
for a mental health screening and, if necessary, an evaluation as part of the
presentence investigation. (R. pp. 136-138.) On appeal Christofferson argues
the district court abused its discretion because the purpose of the requested
evaluation was to assist Christofferson prepare her defense, whereas an Idaho
Code § 19-2524 screening and evaluation are “mainly for the benefit of the
district court.” (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 18-19.) Christofferson’s argument on
appeal fails.
While the underlying purposes of an Idaho Code § 19-2524 evaluation
and an evaluation conducted pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 may, in some
cases, be different, Christofferson fails to articulate how an actual mental health
evaluation prepared pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2524 would differ from the one
she requested pursuant to her 12.2 motion. Both would result in an evaluation of
her mental health for use at sentencing. Even if there was a difference between
the two, the district court’s denial of Christofferson’s Rule 12.2 motion did not
amount to an abuse of discretion under the facts of this case.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Denial of a request for expert or investigative assistance will not be

disturbed absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion by rendering
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a decision which is clearly erroneous and unsupported by the circumstances of
the case.” State v. Brackett, 160 Idaho 619, 377 P.3d 1082, 1097 (Ct. App.
2016, review denied Aug. 5, 2016); see also State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 395,
648 P.2d 203, 207 (1982); State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 392, 825 P.2d 482,
489 (1992); State v. Haynes, 159 Idaho 36, 41, 355 P.3d 1266, 1271 (2015)
(district court held magistrate court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
defendant’s Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 motion).
“When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether the
lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court
acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any
legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached
its decision by an exercise of reason.” State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768
P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989) (citation omitted); see also Brown, 121 Idaho at 392,
825 P.2d at 489.
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied
Christofferson’s Motion For A Psychological Evaluation Pursuant To Idaho
Criminal Rule 12.2
After Christofferson pled guilty to felony vehicular manslaughter, she

moved for additional defense services pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2. (R.,
pp. 128-130.) Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 allows a district court to order public
funds to pay for investigative, expert, or other services that are necessary for the
defendant’s defense. I.C.R. 12.2(a). The defendant is required to include the
scope and details of the services requested, the reasons the requested services

7

are “relevant and necessary to the defense,” and information regarding the
proposed providers of the service. See I.C.R. 12.2. Further, the district court
must find the defendant is indigent as set forth in I.C. § 19-854 before the district
court may order public funds to pay for the requested services. I.C.R. 12.2(c).
Here, Christofferson moved to hire an expert to conduct a psychological
evaluation “to assist for mitigation purposes at sentencing.” (R., pp. 128-130).
Christofferson requested $5,000 to $10,000 for the psychological evaluation.
(R., pp. 128-130).
The district court entered a written order denying Christofferson’s motion
for additional defense services, finding the “additional services would be
duplicative of what has already been ordered.” (R., pp. 135-140.) Specifically,
the court reasoned:
The Court finds the request for these additional services would be
duplicative of what has already been ordered. Pursuant to Idaho
Code (IC) § 19-2524 any defendant who has been found guilty of a
felony undergoes a screening to determine if they are in need of an
assessment for a substance abuse disorder and/or a mental health
examination. If it is determined from the screening that further
examination is necessary, the case is referred to the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare for a full assessment. As such,
the defendant’s request for a psychological examination is
unnecessary.
(R., pp. 136-138.)
On appeal Christofferson argues the district court abused its discretion
because the purposes of an Idaho Code § 19-2524 evaluation and an evaluation
conducted at a defendant’s request pursuant to Rule 12.2 are different. (See
Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-19.) Christofferson claims they are different because a
§ 19-2524 screening and evaluation are “mainly for the benefit of the district
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court” whereas Rule 12.2 is “intended to aid the defendant in preparing a
defense.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 18-19.) Christofferson alleges that the district
court did not recognize this distinction and thus did not act consistently with
applicable legal standards. (Id.) Christofferson’s argument fails.
While the underlying purposes behind Idaho Code § 19-2524 and Rule
12.2 may be different, there is no substantive difference between what
Christofferson requested in her particular Rule 12.2 motion and what is provided
for under Idaho Code § 19-2524.

Christofferson’s Rule 12.2 motion sought

funding for a “comprehensive psychological examination to assist for mitigation
purposes at sentencing.”

(R., pp. 129-130.)

As the basis for her motion,

Christofferson stated she had a “significant and complicated mental health
history” with “potential” diagnoses. (R., pp. 128-130.) As found by the district
court, however, Christofferson failed to establish the requested evaluation was
necessary because, pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524, Christofferson would
automatically undergo a mental health screening, and if necessary, a “full”
psychological evaluation, for the court’s consideration at sentencing. (See R.,
pp. 136-138 (citing I.C. § 19-2524).)
Christofferson does not articulate how the mental health examination she
requested and the evaluation contemplated by Idaho Code § 19-2524 actually
differ.

She states on appeal, that their purposes are different but does not

actually articulate how the end result of these two examinations would be any
different.

Nor can she.

Idaho Code § 19-2524 mandates, “as part of the

presentence process” in “every felony case,” “a screening to determine whether
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a defendant is in need of…a mental health examination.” I.C. §19-2524(1)(a).
“Should the mental health screening indicate that a serious mental illness may
be present,” the defendant must be referred to the Department of Health and
Welfare for “further examination,” which must “include an in-depth evaluation” of
a number of factors bearing on the defendant’s psychological condition.
I.C. § 19-2524(a), (b)(i)-(vii). A detailed report of the mental health examination
must be provided to the court, “as part of the presentence report,” for the court’s
consideration at sentencing. I.C. § 19-2524(c). There is no difference between
the “comprehensive” psychological evaluation Christofferson requested and “indepth evaluation” contemplated by I.C. § 19-2524. Both result in a complete
evaluation of the defendant’s mental condition to inform the court’s sentencing
decision.
If prior to sentencing, Christofferson felt the Idaho Code § 19-2524
examination that was ultimately conducted was inadequate, or if it raised
additional mental health issues, there is nothing that prevented her either
challenging that evaluation or from filing an amended 12.2 motion seeking
additional mental health evaluations to help prepare her defense.

1

Even if there

were differences between the two examinations, those differences would not
amount to an abuse of discretion. While the purposes behind the rule and the
statute may be different, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it

1

At sentencing Christofferson’s counsel did address the inadequacy of the Idaho
Code § 19-2524 evaluation that was prepared in this case. (2/26/16 Tr., p. 71, L.
24 – p. 77, L. 3.) However, Christofferson does not raise this issue on appeal.
Christofferson limits her appeal to the denial of the Rule 12.2 motion, which was
made before the Idaho Code § 19-2524 evaluation was done.
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determined that spending $5,000 to $10,000 for an additional psychological
evaluation was unnecessary in light of Idaho Code § 19-2524. (R., pp. 128-130.)
Christofferson has failed to show the district court abused its discretion.
D.

Even If The District Court Abused Its Discretion, The Error Was Harmless
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied

Christofferson’s Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 motion for funding or a psychological
evaluation for use as mitigation at sentencing because a psychological
evaluation, if necessary, was already mandated by I.C. § 19-2524. However,
even if it did, the error was harmless.

Error is not reversible unless it is

prejudicial. See State v. Stoddard, 105 Idaho 169, 171, 667 P.2d 272, 274 (Ct.
App. 1983). Where the district court denies motion, the State has the burden of
demonstrating that the error did not contribute to the district court’s decision.
See State v. Stone, 154 Idaho 949, 959, 303 P.3d 636, 646 (Ct. App. 2013); see
also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221, 245 P.3d 961, 973 (2010). Here, the
decision to deny Christofferson’s Rule 12.2 motion did not contribute to the
district court’s sentence.
The district court’s sentence would not have been changed if there had
been an additional mental health evaluation. Christofferson killed Staci Shyrock.
Prior to killing Ms. Shyrock, Christofferson was driving all over the road. (R., pp.
16-17.) She crossed the centerline and crashed head on with the motorcycle
ridden by Ms. Shyrock. (R., pp. 14-17.) Christofferson possessed a glass pipe
with white methamphetamine residue. (R., pp. 15-16.) She also had a bottle of
prescription Clonazepam pills.

(Id.; PSI, p. 5.)
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Christofferson admitted to

smoking marijuana before she drove. (R., p. 16.) She also admitted that she
used methamphetamine and prescription pills that same day. (R., p. 32.) The
hospital tests showed that Christofferson had methamphetamine in her system.
(2/26/15 Tr., p. 56, Ls. 5-14.) Christofferson also had three prior convictions for
possession of marijuana. (PSI, pp. 9-10.)
The district court also had information regarding Christofferson’s mental
health at sentencing. Attached to the PSI was the “GAIN-I Recommendation
and Referral Summary (G-RRS).” (See PSI, pp. 35-46.) This report, based
upon ASAM criteria, self-report and clinical observation, recommended that
Christofferson be placed in a 24-hour supervised structured environment
because she is “a risk of danger to herself and to others while under the
influence[.]” (PSI, p. 45.)
Also attached to the PSI was a “19-2524 DHW Mental Health Examination
Report.” (PSI, pp. 47-49.) The 19-2524 Mental Health Examination Report was
“completed by licensed mental health clinician.” (PSI, p. 47.) Although the § 192524 Report did not contain all of the information required by statute, it did
include recommendations for treatment and incorporated the recommendations
made in the GAIN report. (PSI, p. 49.) The district court found it had enough
information. (2/26/16 Tr., p. 95, L. 24 – p. 96, L. 16.) The district court had
information regarding Christofferson’s mental health when it made its sentencing
decision.
It is not clear what additional information would have been contained in a
second psychological evaluation.

However, even if the district court had
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permitted an additional psychological evaluation, it is not clear whether
Christofferson would have even wanted one.

After the PSI was completed,

Christofferson informed her counsel that she did not want a psychological
evaluation. (2/26/16 Tr., p. 85, L. 17 – p. 86, L. 5.) Christofferson’s counsel
explained:
[Christofferson] didn’t know until this morning that I was even going
to go here. I looked at this in depth yesterday, and, in particular, I
do apologize. Like I said, at one point in time we did ask for that
psych evaluation because – and I know my colleague that
represented [Christofferson] previous to me wanted to get that.
And I guess when [Christofferson] told me she didn’t want one at
that time, and that was after the PSI, I guess I decided I could live
with that, but the more I looked at it, the more I decided I can’t. I
can’t live with a record that ignores this mental illness in the fashion
that this particular alleged examination report does.
(Id.)

Christofferson reiterated that she did not want an evaluation during

allocution. (2/26/16 Tr., p. 98, Ls. 19-22.)
The district court examined the presentence investigation, the GAIN
assessment, the I.C. § 19-2524 assessment, and the letter and the comments
from the victim’s family and Christofferson’s family. (2/26/16 Tr., p. 104, L. 22 –
p. 113, L. 9.)

The district court specifically stated it was considering

Christofferson’s mental health diagnosis in mitigation. (2/26/16 Tr., p. 106, Ls. 210.) After weighing mitigating factors against aggravating factors, the district
court sentenced Christofferson to ten years with five years fixed. (2/26/16 Tr., p.
105, L. 13 – p. 112, L. 23; R., pp. 153-158.) This was two years less fixed time
than the state recommended. (2/26/16 Tr., p. 60, L. 21 – p. 61, L. 9.)
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Christofferson’s motion for an additional psychological evaluation.
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However,

even if it did, the error was harmless. Christofferson pled guilty to voluntary
manslaughter for killing Ms. Shyrock. The district court’s sentence of ten years
with five years fixed would not have been different if the district court had
ordered an additional psychological examination. Any error was harmless.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the
district court.
DATED this 22nd day of November, 2016.
_/s/ Ted S. Tollefson____
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of November, 2016, served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing
an electronic copy to:
BEN P. McGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.
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_/s/ Ted S. Tollefson____
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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